To take advantage of this strategic position, the Department of Defense must re-tool the global posture of the force to project power quickly and sustain it along a new strategic perimeter. The capabilities needed to prevail in this environment include sea power, long-range aviation, and a network of forward operating locations to support a sustained presence. U.S. sea power is not structured to project a sustained influence throughout the new perimeter, particularly in the Arctic. To fulfill this fundamental requirement, the U.S. will have to rely on long-range aviation. In order to sustain a power projection capability, a series of forward operating locations from the Marshall Islands to the Aleutians, across the North Pole to the Arabian Gulf, to the Caribbean, and south to the Falklands provides the foundation from which to project power. In the next 20 years, the technology is available to independently provide power, fuel, and water to this structure thereby ensuring U.S. ability to project and sustain power across this vast strategic perimeter.
Introduction

As the U.S. Department of Defense begins to look beyond the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan to project its defense requirements in 2032 and beyond, it faces an uncertain future.
In the next twenty years the emerging economies of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) will overtake the G7 economies of the United States, France, Canada, Italy, United Kingdom, Japan, and Germany in terms of gross domestic product. 1 This shift in economic strength will be accompanied by a shift in the world order from one dominated by the United
States to a multipolar one. 2 The rise of BRIC countries are sure to change the global strategic picture, the question is how. The demand on the world's resources by the BRIC and G7 nations will be exacerbated by the demand from the Next Eleven emerging economies. 3 While the BRIC countries continue to grow and realize their potential, the Arctic icepack will continue to shrink. In September 2012 the extent of the ice reached a record low: 18 percent below the previous record in 2007 and 49 percent below the 1979-2000 average. The last six years have seen the six lowest ice minimums since the satellite era began in 1979. 4 As the ice continues to retreat over the next two decades, the possibility for a major shift in global trade routes increases and additional energy resources become available.
Given this likelihood, one potential outcome is an international landscape where today's emphasis on free trade is overtaken by an environment characterized by intense competition for raw materials such and oil, natural gas, and basic minerals. This paper explores issues surrounding power projection should the current world order devolve into such a multipolar, mercantilist environment. Such an environment would force the United States to rethink its strategic position in terms of resource availability and access to these resources in order to ensure an advantageous position in a less friendly, multipolar world. These interests would define a new strategic perimeter, which would, in turn, drive the future defense posture and requirements needed to project power quickly and sustain it along the edges of this perimeter.
To describe the posture and requirements for this future, this study first provides a brief description of this Mercantilist alternate future in 2032 and identifies fundamental challenges for the United States given this environment. Based on this analysis, it then outlines a strategy to meet the challenges and discusses global base posture required for the U.S. to prevail. Finally, it makes recommendations as to the military capabilities that are most important to the United States in this future. The study begins by describing a future where today's international system no longer exists, and the world devolves to a structure last seen in the 18 th century.
Assumptions: The Mercantilist World of 2032 5
Understanding how a mercantilist world would affect U.S. defense requirements arises from an understanding of how different this world is. In the mercantilist world of 2032, Nationalism is on the rise in Asia, Europe, and North America as economic disruptions create a serious rift between the world leading economies. As free trade collapses, the competition for natural resources intensifies. This scramble for resources leads to protectionism, increasingly independent action on the part of nations, and larger defense budgets. 
A New Strategic Perimeter
This scenario presents points of continuity and change for U.S. defense planners. In such a shift toward a multi-polar, mercantilist world order, the fundamental challenges for the U.S.
remain similar to historical norms: ensure security of the homeland; ensure access to trade routes and freedom of navigation; and ensure access to natural resources. 6 The change, however, is the areas of the world that become more strategically relevant. Accordingly, a regionally based approach of 'hold' or 'pursue' exploits the available resources in North and South America and offers the opportunity to redefine the strategic perimeter of the United States. To establish a common framework, a brief description of the terms 'hold' and 'pursue' is necessary.
'Hold' in the context of this strategy encompasses three concepts: economy of effort, participation with regional partners and allies, and continued trade. Militarily, security cooperation and maintaining access to existing bases and ports are the primary objectives. This may sound like another way of saying, "maintain the status quo." However, in the mercantilist future described above, the status quo has degenerated from the U.S. perspective and 'holding' onto relative stability in territorial disputes, access to facilities, and freedom of navigation over trade routes (both sea and air) will require focused action. But 'holding' will be an economy of effort activity because the U.S. must 'pursue' its interests in other regions.
'Pursue' in the context of this strategy encompasses an expansion of American presence, the development of new operating locations, and participation with regional partners and allies.
Freedoms of navigation, protection of resources within U.S. and regional partner economic zones, and diplomatic activity to establish operating locations are the primary objectives. In the
The Pacific
In At the same time, the reliance of the United States on Middle Eastern oil is projected to come to an end by 2032. British Petroleum, in its annual energy outlook, predicts growth in biofuel supplies and unconventional oil and gas will turn North America's energy deficit into a surplus. 9 Further, the Wall Street Journal reported OPEC's own analysis concluded oil shipments from the Middle East to America "could almost be nonexistent." 10 The International
Energy Agency (IEA) predicts American oil imports will drop below 30 percent of demand and the United States will become an exporter of natural gas. While the American energy outlook stands to improve significantly, the IEA predicts the European Union will all grow more reliant on imports of oil and natural gas. 11 Therefore, maintaining the current close relations with Europe, both bilaterally and regionally through NATO and the European Union, solidifies access to markets and secures trade routes across the Atlantic and into the Mediterranean.
The Western Hemisphere
In contrast to the 'hold' approach employed in the Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East, is approximately 3200 miles and it is almost 3000 miles from the Aleutians to Svalbard Island north of Norway in the Barents Sea. 13 While the increase in trade due to a lack of sea ice will bring economic benefits, it will also bring environmental concerns, criminal activity, and illegal immigration. 14 The climate, large area, and limited infrastructure all conspire to deny access and make power projection difficult.
The Opening of the Arctic
The scramble for resources in the Arctic has already begun: the U.S. must prepare now to operate in the "High North." In the last three years the number of ships using the Northern Sea Route (figure 2) has increased from four vessels in 2010 to 34 in 2011 to 46 in 2012. 
Oil and Natural Gas
In 2008, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) estimated the total undiscovered oil and natural gas resources in the Arctic at 90 billion barrels of oil, and 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The study, known as the Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal, assessed the potential for recoverable oil and gas reserves north of the Arctic Circle. 19 The USGS assumed current technological capabilities to recover oil and gas along with assumptions that resources would be recoverable in the presence of permanent sea ice and ocean water depth. Further, the study estimated 84 percent of the undiscovered oil and gas resides offshore. An important consideration is where in the Arctic region these natural resources are located. In other words, four of the five provinces estimated to contain 70 percent of the oil and one of the three provinces projected to contain 70 percent of the gas are within the 200-mile economic zone of the United States, Canada, and Greenland (see figure 3) . The USGS estimates are based only on conventional reserves. Not included are the oil and gas reserves associated with shale oil and gas, tar sands, heavy oil, tight gas, and coalbed gas, therefore the resource potential is even greater. 21 The combination of resource availability and trade routes helps to explain the increased interest in national boundaries by the Arctic Nations, particularly Russia. Notably, because the U.S. has not ratified the UNCLOS, the U.S. is strategically behind in the race to define Artic borders and resource access. 
Capabilities to Support a New Strategic Perimeter
The capabilities needed to safeguard U.S. interests along this new strategic perimeter include sea power, long-range aviation, and a network of forward operating locations to support a sustained presence. American sea power is not structured to project a sustained influence throughout the new perimeter, particularly in the Arctic. As Reginald Smith outlines in his 2011
Joint Forces Quarterly article, ships capable of icebreaking operations are essential to protect sovereignty, conduct search and rescue, and protect resources. None of the three U.S.
icebreakers are configured for these operations. In contrast, Canada and Russia both maintain fleets several times the size of the United States. In the current resource constrained environment, catching up will take decades and as much as $20 billion. 29 While the U.S. is capable of sustaining a significant Naval presence in the Pacific, Atlantic, and the Mediterranean as part of the 'hold' approach described earlier, sea power will be significantly limited in the Arctic. More importantly, the Arctic presents unique challenges to operations that must also be addressed.
Navigation Challenges
The combination of weather, drifting ice, heading accuracy, lack of radio-navigation aids, and poorly mapped areas present a navigational challenge that ranges from difficult to dangerous. 30 The Global Navigational Satellite System (GNSS) and nautical charts have significant limitations in the Arctic. Geometry and ionospheric effects reduce GNSS performance while much of the Arctic waters remain uncharted. The waters that have been charted were surveyed, in many cases, with technology dating back to the 1800s. 31 Inclination angles for GPS and Galileo satellites are 55 and 56 degrees respectively while GLONASS inclination angles are marginally better at 65 degrees. In the Arctic, this means low elevation angles which leads to errors in vertical position. In addition, horizontal position accuracy is reduced by higher noise levels in the GNSS signal and larger ionospheric effects. 32 Ionospheric models in the GNSS receiver or positioning algorithm normally handle these signal delays. In the Arctic, however, the ionosphere is characterized by large changes in the electron content (the northern lights are an example) and the models used in GNSS systems are not sufficient. The result is significant errors in positioning. 33 This not only affects navigation accuracy, but weapons accuracy as well. The long-term solution is better models of ionospheric effects, but in the near term an executable solution to improve position accuracy is the combination of GNSS and inertial systems.
Surveillance and Communications
In addition to precision navigation, the basic functions of surveillance and communications are often taken for granted, but in the Arctic these functions are also significantly limited. In an effort to increase Canadian capability, Canada has taken significant steps in recent years to improve sea surveillance. In 2007, the Canadians launched Radarsat-2 to facilitate ship tracking and Arctic region surveillance in general. The data from these satellites is provided to NORAD and three more satellites are scheduled for 2014-15. 34 In addition, the Canadians deployed a tethered sonar array off Devon Island in the Barrow Strait to provide persistent surveillance at the eastern entrance to the Northwest Passage. 35 Even with improved surveillance capabilities, the data must be communicated to be useful. Russia launched an additional meridian telecommunications satellite in November 2012
to improve communications along the Northern Sea Route. The meridian series satellites are dual use for both civilian and military activity. 36 In contrast, dedicated U.S. military communications satellites typically fly in orbits that are below the elevation constraint on most Arctic terminals and are therefore not usable. In terms of commercially available satellite communications, Iridium is the only service currently available in the Arctic. 37 To leverage combined capabilities in the near term and make efficient use of resources in the long term, close ties with NATO and continued partnership with Canada through the North American Air
Defense Command (NORAD) will advance U.S. interests and mitigate limitations in sea power, surveillance, and communications, but to project power in the Arctic the U.S. will need to look to other capabilities.
To project power and ensure access to resources and trade routes in the Arctic, the U.S.
must rely on long-range aviation. In the mercantilist world order of 2032, surveillance, airlift, search and rescue, and protection of resources and trade routes are all aviation missions. In an international environment where access to bases is questionable, the DoD must place a premium on range when structuring the fleet of the future. However, there are practical limits to how far these capabilities will be able to range even with an optimized fleet. Therefore, to sustain a power projection capability at the edge of this defense perimeter, a series of forward operating locations will be necessary.
Forward Operating Locations
A third island chain defined by the Marshall Islands at Kwajalein extending north to Wake Island and continuing north to the Aleutian Island locations of Shemya, Adak, and Dutch
Harbor provides support to operations throughout the Pacific and into the Arctic. Together these locations sit between the first island chain and the United States and astride the approaches to the Bering Strait and the northern trade routes leading into Arctic. Forward operating locations mitigate the distances involved with protecting U.S. interests, establish presence, and enable power projection activities such as surveillance, communications, and search and rescue. However, to be effective these locations must have, as a minimum, power, fuel, and water. Fuel and water currently require significant air or sealift to sustain and power must either be generated with diesel fuel or purchased locally if possible. These considerations require a modified logistics concept and new technologies to enable power projection.
Forward Operating Location Logistics in 2032
In 2032, the air and sealift resources required to re-supply locations throughout the Pacific and the Arctic will not be available, therefore, the capability to independently provide power, fuel, and water to forward operating locations would significantly reduce the vulnerability of operating locations as well as the logistics tail. The technology is currently available to allow the DoD to do just that in the next 20 years.
Advancements in nuclear reactors have led to a non-light water reactor class of device that can replace a current diesel powered generator or provide the source for a 25 Megawatt nuclear power plant. 41 Generating power is done in a variety of ways including using batteries, 
Recommendations
The DoD must re-tool the structure of the force to project power quickly and sustain it in the Arctic. The capabilities needed to prevail in this environment include sea power, surveillance, communications, long-range aviation, and a network of forward operating locations to support a sustained presence. In the Arctic environment, U.S. sea power, surveillance, and communications all have limitations that require significant resources and time to overcome. To project power into the Arctic, the U.S. will have to rely on long-range aviation. To support such activity a series of forward operating locations from the Marshall Islands to the Aleutians, across the North Pole to Norway provides the posture from which to project power into the Arctic. To accomplish this, the study provides the following recommendations.
Develop Existing Operating Locations
In order to prepare for increased ship traffic through the Arctic, begin developing existing operating locations in partnership with Canada, Denmark, and Norway. will be necessary to develop requirements for each location. 45 One way to develop these operating locations and simultaneously build capability is to participate in Arctic exercises such as Norway's Cold Response and search and rescue exercises with Russia, NORAD, and NATO.
Partner with Canada and Norway
Given the resources and time required to field icebreakers, communications systems, and sea surveillance, combining capability with Canada and Norway provides an opportunity to project influence into the Arctic in the near term. The United States contribution to the partnership is long-range aviation. In addition, these partnerships should be leveraged to develop and field systems to provide a common operating picture and execute command and control of forces in the Arctic.
Develop and Field Technologies to Provide Stand-Alone Power and Fuel
In the long term, the United States must develop and field technologies in advanced nuclear reactors and the production of jet fuel from seawater to provide island and coastal locations with stand-alone power and fuel. Power projection along a new strategic perimeter will require locations from which to operate and communicate. Over the next 20 years, the technology is available to independently provide power, fuel, and water to this structure thereby ensuring U.S. ability to meet the fundamental challenges of a mercantilist world order.
Conclusion
Regardless of the character of the future international environment, the United States must turn its attention to the Arctic now. In this time of austerity and re-posturing the force, the 
